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Disrupting	Regulation,	Regulating	Disruption:	
The	Politics	of	Uber	in	the	United	States	Platform	 companies	 disrupt	 not	 only	 the	 economic	 sectors	 they	enter,	but	also	the	regulatory	regimes	that	govern	those	sectors.	We	examine	 Uber	 in	 the	 United	 States	 as	 a	 case	 of	 regulating	 this	disruption	 in	 different	 arenas:	 cities,	 state	 legislatures,	 and	 judicial	venues.	 	 We	 find	 that	 the	 politics	 of	 Uber	 regulation	 does	 not	conform	 to	 existing	 models	 of	 regulation.	 We	 describe	 instead	 a	pattern	 of	 disrupted	 regulation,	 characterized	 by	 a	 consistent	challenger-incumbent	 cleavage,	 in	 two	 steps.	 	 First,	 an	 existing	regulatory	regime	is	not	deregulated	but	successfully	disregarded	by	a	 new	 entrant.	 Second,	 the	 politics	 of	 subsequently	 regulating	 the	challenger	 leads	 to	 a	 dual	 regulatory	 regime.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Uber,	disrupted	 regulation	 takes	 the	 form	of	 challenger	 capture,	 an	 elite-driven	 pattern,	 in	 which	 the	 challenger	 has	 largely	 prevailed.	 It	 is	further	 characterized	 by	 the	 surrogate	 representation	 of	 dispersed	actors—customers	 and	 drivers—who	 do	 not	 have	 autonomous	power	 and	who	 rely	 instead	 on	 alignment	with	 the	 challenger	 and	incumbent.	In	its	surrogate	capacity	in	city	and	state	regulation,	Uber	has	frequently	mobilized	large	numbers	of	customers	and	drivers	to	lobby	for	policy	outcomes	that	allow	it	to	continue	to	provide	service	on	 terms	 it	 finds	 acceptable.	 	 Because	 drivers	 have	 reaped	 less	advantage	from	these	alignments,	labor	issues	have	been	taken	up	in	judicial	 venues,	 again	 primarily	 by	 surrogates	 (usually	 plaintiffs’	attorneys)	but	to	date	have	not	been	successful.	
The	disruption	brought	by	the	new	labor	platform	economy	has	been	both	welcomed	as	a	process	of	creative	destruction	and	resisted	as	trampling	on	well-established	regulations	that	protect	the	interests	of	workers	and	the	public.	Platform	companies	increase	efficiency	in	the	provision	of	services.	They	may	also	disrupt	the	economic	sectors	they	enter	and	existing	regulatory	regimes.	Regulators	must	classify	and	create	rules	for	the	new	phenomenon	of	platform	companies.	This	article	examines	Uber	as	a	case	of	this	disruption	to	analyze	the	politics	of	regulatory	response.	We	argue	that	the	main	extant	models	of	the	politics	of	regulation	do	not	fit	the	Uber	case,	which	we	analyze	instead	as	a	case	of	challenger	capture:		a	form	of	“disrupted	regulation”	in	which	the	new	entrant	largely	prevails.		Uber	is	one	of	the	most	successful	hi-tech	companies	and	is	the	dominant	player	in	the	ride-hailing	 sector.	Within	 3	 years	 of	 its	 launch	 in	 2012,	 UberX,	 Uber’s	most	 popular	 service,	grew	 remarkably,	 reaching	 nearly	 half	 a	million	 active	 drivers	 in	 150	 cities	 in	 the	United	
3 
States.1	It	 disrupted	 a	 century-old	 taxi	 industry,	 resulting	 in	 a	 sharp	 decline	 in	medallion	values,	 taxi	 driver	 income,	 and	 taxi	 ridership	 in	 US	 cities.2	Uber	 entered	 urban	 markets	claiming	 to	 be	 a	 “technology	 company”	 and	 operated	 in	 disregard	 of	 taxi	 regulations.	 It	thereby	disrupted	 the	ride-hailing	market	and	challenged	regulations	 that	both	controlled	entry	and	fares	and	imposed	consumer	protection	and	safety	requirements.		How,	then,	did	government	respond?		Existing	 analyses	 of	 regulation	 generally	 conform	 to	 what	 we	 may	 call	 the	 industrial	capture,	public	interest	regulation,	and	deregulatory	models.	The	industrial	capture	model,	pioneered	by	Stigler,	puts	 in	opposition	 the	private	vs.	public	 (or	producer	vs.	 consumer)	interests.3		 It	 argues	 that	 concentrated	 private	 actors	 with	 high	 stakes	 use	 a	 variety	 of	strategies	to	influence	policy	and	thwart	regulation	in	the	public	interest.		Trumbull,	to	the	contrary,	 argues	 that	 state	 regulation	 can	 serve	 the	public	 interest	when	diffuse	 interests	are	represented	by	advocacy	groups	or	activists,	such	as	consumer	rights	organizations	that	form	alliances	with	 the	 state.4		The	 third	model	 responds	 in	part	 to	 the	deregulatory	 turn	since	 the	 1980s.	 Carpenter	 and	 Moss	 present	 a	 model	 of	 “corrosive	 capture,”	 in	 which	regulated	 “firms	 push	 the	 regulatory	 process	 in	 a	 ‘weaker’	 direction”	 through	 reduced	“formulation,	application,	or	enforcement”	of	existing	regulations.5	Each	of	 these	models	has	proposed	answers	 to	a	number	of	questions:	what	are	 the	main	interest	cleavages;	which	interests	tend	to	be	served;	and	how.	The	Uber	model	of	disrupted	regulation	 presents	 a	 different	 combination	 of	 answers	 than	 is	 suggested	 by	 any	 one	 of	these	models.	 	 Far	 from	a	 unitary	 actor,	 the	 private	 interest	must	 be	 disaggregated.	 	One	cleavage	 pits	 pro-regulation	 incumbents	 against	 anti-regulation	 challengers,	 as	 noted	 by	Vogel.	6		 	 A	 second	 is	 the	 classic	 intra-challenger	 cleavage	 between	 labor	 and	 capital.	 	 	 In	addition,	 the	 relationship	 of	 private	 and	 public	 interests	 is	 characterized	 by	 neither	 their	opposition,	prominent	in	the	capture	literature,	nor	their	congruity,	as	in	the	pro-consumer,	free-market	 approach	 that	 underlies	 some	 anti-rent-seeking	 deregulation	 assumptions.	The	pattern	is	similar	to	what	Carpenter	and	Moss	call	“weak	capture,”	in	that	“firms	render	regulation	less	robust	than…what	the	public	interest	would	recommend,”	but	“the	public	is	still	served.”7		However,	Uber	regulation	differs	 from	their	model	of	“corrosive	capture”	 in	that	the	regulated	industry	(taxis)	does	not	favor	deregulation.		Instead,	the	anti-regulation	disrupter	 is	 a	 competitor	 that	 defines	 itself	 as	 a	 different	 industry	 and	not	 subject	 to	 the	extant	 regulatory	 regime.	 	 Further,	 to	 the	 extent	 the	 overall	 ride-hailing	 sector	 can	 be	considered	 deregulated,	 the	 politics	 is	 quite	 different:	 the	 state	 does	 not	 act	 primarily	through	 administrative	 agencies	 nor	 through	 the	 other	 channels	 Carpenter	 and	 Moss	discuss.8	Finally,	 contra	 Trumbull,	 though	 the	 public	 interest	 is	 served	 by	 providing	 a	
1 The Uber company began operations earlier in 2009 as UberCab, an app for licensed black car and 
limousine drivers. We analyze here the “peer-to-peer” UberX model, launched in 2012 and refer to it as Uber 
and UberX interchangeably.  
2 Madhani 2017. Berger et al. 2017. 
3 Stigler 1971. 
4 Trumbull 2006, 2012. In analyzing regulatory policies that may produce pro-consumer outcomes, Trumbull 
(2012:23-25) focuses on three key actors (the state, industry, and social activists) and outlines three types of 
coalitions composed of combinations of two.  Two of these produce private arrangements (industry self-
regulation, and consumer-industry arrangements), and only a coalition between the state and consumer 
activists (or mobilized NGOs, which the government supports or even helps to form) is said to produce pro-
consumer state regulatory policy.  
5 Carpenter 2014, 154; Carpenter and Moss 2014, 17. 
6 Vogel 2018. 
7 Carpenter and Moss 2014, 12, 16. 
8 Carpenter and Moss 2014, 17. 
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desired	 service,	 social	 activists	 and	public	 interest	 advocacy	organizations	play	almost	no	part,	 and	 the	 industry-consumer	 coalition	 (or	 the	 mobilization	 of	 consumers	 by	 and	 on	behalf	 of	Uber)	 is	 activated	 to	oppose	 a	 pro-consumer	 regulation	 that	Uber	 argues	would	cause	it	to	leave	the	market.			We	analyze	Uber	as	a	model	of	disrupted	regulation,	which	has	two	phases.	In	the	first,	an	existing	regulatory	regime,	in	this	case	for	taxis,	was	not	deregulated	but	disregarded	by	the	challenger,	 Uber,	 who	 flouted	 entry	 and	 price	 controls,	 often	 triggering	 cease	 and	 desist	orders	 from	 city	 regulators.	 A	 subsequent	 phase	 involves	 regulation	 and	 has	 occurred	 at	both	 city	 and	 state	 levels—in	 legislative	 and	 sometimes	 regulatory	 bodies—and	 also	 in	judicial	 venues.	 	 It	 conforms	 to	 an	 elite-dominated	 model	 of	 contending	 incumbent	 vs.	challenger	 interests,	 in	which	 the	 latter	has	 largely	prevailed.	 	 In	 this	model	of	 challenger	capture,	Uber	 has	 been	 able	 to	 defend	 its	 core	 interests	 of	 low	prices,	 high	driver	 supply	(with	no	labor	regulation),	and	consumer	trust.	While	Uber	initially	rejected	all	regulation,	it	has	most	 vigorously	opposed	 those	 central	 to	 its	business	model	 of	 low-cost	 service	with	dynamic	pricing,	frictionless	entry	of	drivers,	and	no	vehicle	caps.		Uber	 regulation	 follows	 a	 pattern	 of	 elite-driven	 politics	 in	 which	 dispersed	 actors	(consumers	 and	 drivers)	 are	 weak	 and	 are	 represented	 primarily	 by	 surrogates.	 	 It	 is	 a	model	of	challenger	capture,	with	the	following	traits:			
• Rather	 than	 deregulation	 per	 se,	 the	 hi-tech	 disrupter	 disregards	 existing	regulations,	including	barriers	to	entry	and	price	controls.	
• Concentrated	interests	dominate	the	subsequent	politics	of	regulation,	in	which	the	disrupter	 has	 both	 substantial	 structural	 power	 and	 novel—as	 well	 as	conventional—forms	of	instrumental	power	and	has	defended	its	core	interests.		
• Dispersed	 consumers	 depend	 on	 shifting	 alignments	 with	 concentrated	 interests.		Consumers	are	aligned	with	challengers	on	high	supply	and	low	cost	of	service—on	which	Uber	acts	as	a	surrogate	and	mobilizes	their	support.	 	They	are	aligned	with	taxi	 incumbents,	 who	 fight	 for	 consumer	 protection	 and	 safety	 regulations.	Consumer	interests	have	been	addressed	in	legislative	venues	in	a	pattern	of	elite-driven	politics.	
• Dispersed	 drivers	 are	 aligned	 with	 Uber	 on	 issues	 concerning	 Uber’s	 on-going	presence	in	a	city,	but,	given	any	further	lack	of	alignment	with	concentrated	actors,	labor	issues	have	been	addressed	primarily	by	surrogate	actors	in	courts.		
• A	 dual	 regulatory	 regime	 has	 emerged,	which	 preserves	 extensive	 regulations	 for	the	 incumbent	 taxi	 industry	 while	 creating	 much	 weaker	 regulations	 for	 the	challenger,	Uber.		Uber	 is	 a	 particularly	 good	 case	 for	 analysis.	 To	 date,	 it	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 the	 most	regulatory	attention	and	thus	provides	a	good	basis	for	empirical	examination.	Also,	Uber	is	a	“most	likely”	case	for	high	regulation	in	at	least	two	ways.	First,	 it	enters	a	sector	with	a	strong	 regulatory	 regime	 and	 one	 that	 is	 defended	 by	 entrenched	 rent-seeking	 interests.	Second,	Uber	exercises	a	high	degree	of	control	over	work	conditions,	a	defining	condition	of	 employee	 status,	 and	 it	 is	 thereby	 most	 susceptible	 to	 labor	 regulation	 and	misclassification	 lawsuits	 and	 rulings.9	To	 the	 extent	 regulations	 are	 limited	 in	 the	 Uber	case,	they	are	unlikely	to	be	enacted	for	other	labor	platforms.	Strikingly,	we	find	that	this	“most	likely”	case	has	experienced	only	weak	regulation.																																																										
9 Collier, Dubal, and Carter 2017. 
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	The	primarily	qualitative	analysis	that	follows	uses	several	sources	of	data,	including	news	coverage	 and	 interviews	 with	 taxi	 interests,	 Uber	 drivers,	 Uber	 employees,	 plaintiffs’	attorneys,	 defense	 attorneys,	 labor	 advocates,	 legislators,	 and	 legislative	 aides.10		We	 use	case	studies	 to	examine	 the	politics	of	city-level	regulation.	We	then	 turn	 to	regulation	by	the	states,	analyzing	an	original	database	of	all	regulations	passed	between	2014	and	2016	and	a	case	study	of	California,	the	first	site	of	UberX	as	well	as	the	first	state	to	regulate	it	and	 a	 particularly	 influential	 case	 of	 regulation.11	Finally,	 we	 examine	 judicial	 regulation	using	a	database	of	court	dockets	from	2012-2016	in	federal	and	state	courts	in	California,	Texas,	and	New	York,	and	focus	our	discussion	on	the	key	“test”	cases	filed	against	Uber.		It	should	 be	 noted	 that	 regulations	 generally	 refer	 to	 TNCs,	 or	 transportation	 network	companies,	as	platform-based	ride-hailing	companies	have	come	to	be	called.										
REGULATORY	AGENDA			With	 the	advent	of	Uber,	a	number	of	 regulatory	 issues	have	been	raised	by	stakeholders	and	policy	advocates,	 including	taxi	companies,	 foundations,	NGOs,	bloggers,	and	scholars.	Public	 officials	 have	 taken	 action	 on	 only	 a	 subset	 of	 these	 issues.	 Regulatory	 inaction	occurs	 either	 because	 of	 a	 failure	 to	 pass	 a	 proposed	 law	 or	 obtain	 a	 ruling	 in	 court,	 or	because	 issues	have	not	even	made	 it	 to	 the	agenda	 in	 legislatures	or	brought	 to	 trial.	To	assess	the	areas	in	which	public	officials	have	and	have	not	acted,	we	compile	a	“regulatory	agenda”	 of	 the	 issues	 that	 have	 been	 proposed	 or	 enacted.	 	 We	 group	 them	 into	 five	categories	(Table	1).			The	 first	 two	 categories	 reflect	 their	 labels:	 “safety”	 and	 “consumer	 protection.”	 These	regulations	aim	to	protect	Uber’s	customers	and	the	general	public.	Because	Uber’s	business	model	 depends	 on	 customer	 trust,	 the	 company	 has	 always	 provided	 its	 own	 driver	training,	 required	 background	 checks,	 and	 insisted	 on	 minimum	 vehicle	 standards.	However,	these	items	remain	on	the	regulatory	agenda	because	regulators	consider	the	self-imposed	practices	inadequate		In	addition	to	their	stated	purpose,	consumer	protection	and	safety	regulations	also	reflect	competitive	issues	in	that	they	“level	the	playing	field”	between	Uber	and	taxis.	Indeed,	taxi	interests	often	demand	such	regulations	on	competitive	grounds.		Uber	vigorously	opposes	some	of	these	regulations,	most	notably	fingerprint-based	background	checks,	as	a	rigidity	in	easy	driver	entry.	Other	issues	are	uniquely	related	to	competition	between	Uber	and	the	taxi	sector.	We	include	these	regulations	as	“other	competition.”					 	
																																																								
10 We conducted more than two dozen interviews with taxi interests in San Francisco and New York, 215 
surveys with Uber drivers in San Francisco, 25 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Uber drivers in San 
Francisco, more than two dozen interviews with labor advocates from California and New York, 5 interviews 
with legislators and legislative aides at the city level (San Francisco and Seattle) and the state level 
(California).      
11 The name “Transportation Network Company,” or TNC, was first officially used by California state 
regulators.  
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Table	1.	Regulatory	Agenda		
Category	 Issue	addressed	 Groups	benefitted	
Safety	
Background	checks	
Consumers,	taxis	
Commercial	licenses		Driver	training	Decal	visibility	Vehicle	inspection	regulations	
Consumer	Protection	
Non-discrimination	Fare	disclosure	Accurate	fare	calculation	Accessibility	Insurance	requirements	 	Limit	TNC	sharing	of	consumer	data		 	
Other	Competition	
Permits	and	fees	
Taxis		
Airport	fees	Limits	on	surge	pricing	Caps	on	number	of	vehicles	Ban	ride-pooling	Ban	leasing	of	vehicles	Prohibit	cash	payments	Ban	street	hails	
Worker	protection		
Employee	status		
Drivers			
Right	to	organize/bargain	collectively	Income	(wages	and	stability)	Transparent	rankings	&	process	of	deactivation		Transparent	earnings	calculation	Dispute	resolution	mechanism	Driver	privacy	Ban	penalizing	drivers	who	organize/protest	Prohibit	discrimination	against	drivers	
Public	goods	
Pollution	
Public		Reporting	requirements	Congestion	Coordination	with	public	transit		Ride-pooling		Taxation	
	 Data	security	and	sharing	 	
  7 
Labor	issues	are	also	contentious,	most	saliently	drivers’	legal	classification	as	independent	contractors	rather	than	employees	who	are	protected	by	work	laws,	such	as	the	minimum	wage,	social	security,	right	to	unionize,	and	overtime	pay.	Those	advocating	employee	status	point	to	Uber’s	significant	control	over	conditions	of	work,	the	legal	condition	for	employee	status.	 Opposing	 reclassification	 and	 other	 labor	 regulation,	 Uber	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 not	 an	employer	or	even	a	transportation	company,	but	a	 technology	company	that	simply	offers	the	 software	 that	 matches	 riders	 with	 drivers.	 Importantly,	 some	 labor	 issues	 can	 be	addressed	 without	 reclassification.	 Finally,	 we	 include	 a	 category	 of	 regulations	 that	address	public	goods,	like	congestion	and	public	transit.			In	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows,	 we	 analyze	 the	 politics	 of	 regulating	 these	 categories	 in	different	policy-making	venues.			
	
REGULATION	BY	CITY	GOVERNMENTS	
	After	taxis	replaced	for-hire	horse	carriages	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	city	governments	took	primary	 responsibility	 for	 regulating	 the	 industry.12		A	 century	 later,	when	Uber	and	other	TNCs	were	launched	in	cities	across	the	country,	city	officials	debated	the	best	way	to	address	 these	 entrants,	 which	 were	 structured	 differently	 from	 the	 taxi	 sector	 and	 yet	provided	the	same	service.		In	this	section,	we	examine	the	way	Uber	enters	markets	using	an	 “act	 first,	 apologize	 later”	 strategy	 that	 flouts	 existing	 regulations.	 We	 then	 turn	 to	 a	number	of	hypotheses	that	relate	city	“types”	to	the	regulatory	response	to	this	disruption.		Finally,	 we	 examine	 the	 strategies	 that	 Uber	 has	 employed	 to	 achieve	 its	 preferred	regulatory	outcomes.				We	examine	eight	cities	using	data	gathered	from	an	exhaustive	review	of	online	sources	for	each	city.13	Rather	than	a	representative	sample	of	cities,	we	select	 three	types	of	cities	 to	explore	hypotheses	about	city	characteristics.	 	We	examine	three	steps:	 initial	response	to	Uber’s	entry,	subsequent	regulations,	and	Uber’s	response.		The	first	city	type	 includes	San	Francisco,	Seattle,	and	Austin:	politically	progressive	cities	that	are	innovation	hubs	(Figure	1).	These	two	traits	(i.e.,	progressive	and	hi-tech)	give	rise	to	 two	 contradictory	 hypotheses.	 Such	 cities	might	 be	 friendly	 to	 hi-tech	 interests,	 given	that	 hi-tech	 firms	 hold	 influence	 and	 account	 for	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 local	 economic	 activity.	Alternatively,	 as	 progressive	 cities,	 they	 may	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 regulate,	 especially	 with	respect	 to	 consumer	 protection,	 safety,	 and	 worker	 protection	 issues	 as	 well	 as	 public	goods.			The	 second	 group	 of	 cities—New	 York	 City,	 Chicago,	 and	 Philadelphia—have	 historically	strong	 1)	 regulatory	 agencies	 and	 2)	 incumbent	 taxi	 sectors.	 	 They	 are	 also	 older,	 large,	industrial	 cities	 with	 dense	 urban	 cores	 and	 captured	 regulatory	 regimes	 for	 the	 ride-hailing	 industry.14	Therefore,	 they	might	 be	 expected	 to	 do	more	 to	 prevent	Uber’s	 initial	
																																																								
12 Dubal 2017. 
13 An internet search of Uber regulation in our cities yielded online versions of local and national newspapers 
and other online publications/media sources as well as blogs. 
14 San Francisco also has an entrenched taxi industry, but it is a smaller city and from the late 1970s-2009, 
medallions were non-transferable and had no monetary value. Without medallions as high-value assets, 
taxis had less lobbying power. See Dubal 2017. 
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entry	and	to	enact	regulations	that	level	the	playing	field,	restrict	supply,	and	inhibit	driver	entry.			Finally,	 Houston	 and	 San	 Antonio	 are	 Sunbelt	 cities	 in	 the	 conservative	 state	 of	 Texas,	 a	category	 in	which	we	 can	again	 consider	Austin.	Given	 their	 relatively	 recent	 growth	and	lower	density,	we	might	 expect	 them	 to	have	a	 less	 entrenched	 taxi	 sector	 and	do	 less	 to	halt	Uber’s	initial	entry,	restrict	car	and	driver	supply,	or	pursue	leveling	with	taxis.			
		Figure	1.	City	and	State	Ideology	(Public	Preferences)			Source:	Tausanovich	and	Warshaw	2013			
Step	1:	Disrupting	regulation	
	Uber	 enters	 urban	markets	 extra-legally,	 ignoring	 an	 extensive	 regulatory	 regime,	 which	includes,	among	others,	barriers	 to	entry	and	price	controls;	driver	registration,	 licensing,	and	insurance	requirements;	and	consumer	protection	and	safety	regulations.	Uber’s	entry	thereby	forces	local	or	state	governments	to	respond	reactively	to	a	fait	accompli,	after	Uber	has	 established	 a	base	of	 customers	 and	drivers.15		 City	 officials	 are	 thus	 confronted	with	two	 options:	 allow	 Uber	 to	 operate	 or	 ban	 it—through	 cease	 and	 desist	 orders	 and	 law	enforcement—until	regulations	are	enacted.			The	first	issue	for	regulators	is	whether	TNCs	are	technology	companies,	as	TNCs	insist,	or	transportation	 companies,	 as	 the	 taxi	 sector	 insists.	 	 As	 tech	 companies,	 TNCs	 provide	software	to	match	riders	with	private	drivers.		As	transportation	companies,	they	challenge	the	incumbent	taxi	sector,	which	has	benefited	from	the	classic	regulations	of	entry	barriers	and	price	controls,	thereby	restricting	supply,	maintaining	“high”	prices,	and	supporting		driver	income.		How,	then,	do	cities	respond,	when	Uber	introduces	its	app,	allowing	drivers	in	their	own	cars	to	be	algorithmically	matched	with	a	rider?																																																										
15 Griswold and Murphy 2016. 
●
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We	find	that	timing,	more	than	city	traits,	seems	to	be	the	stronger	predictor	of	responses	to	Uber	entry	(Table	2).	Where	Uber	launched	in	2012	or	2013—San	Francisco,	Seattle,	New	York,	 and	 Chicago—cities	 did	 little	 to	 prevent	 Uber’s	 operation	 upon	 entry.	 In	 the	 three	Texas	cities	and	Philadelphia,	Uber	launched	later—in	2014—after	other	cities	and	states		
		 		Table	2.		Regulatory	Steps	by	Cities		
					
	
	
City	
Step	1	 Step	2	 Step	3	
Pre-Regulation:	
Initial	Response		
	
Regulation:	Notable	features	 Post-Regulation:	Uber	response		San	Francisco		 No	action	 None	 NA	Seattle	 No	action	 Vehicle	caps;	Driver	unionization	 Successful	Uber	protest	of	cap;	formal	challenge	of	unionization	ordinance		
Austin		 Police-enforced	ban	 Fingerprinting	 Leaves	city	after	organizing	and	losing	public	referendum	on	fingerprinting.	Successfully	lobbies	state	to	overturn.	
Houston	 Police-enforced	ban	 Fingerprinting	 Initially	accepts;	then	threatens	to	leave	city	but	remains.	Successfully	lobbies	state	to	overturn.		
San	Antonio	 Police-enforced	ban	 Fingerprinting	 Leaves	city	in	response	to	fingerprinting.	City	changes	regulation	to	make	fingerprinting	optional.		Philadelphia	 Poorly	enforced	UberX	ban	 Ban;	earmarked	taxes	for	education		(state-imposed)	 Continues	operating	UberX	service	despite	ban.	Successfully	lobbies	state	to	overturn.	
New	York	City	 Brief	ban	 Extensive	leveling	(e.g.,	commercial	licenses;	fingerprinting;	driver	training;	permits/fees)	
Successful	mobilization	against	vehicle	caps	proposed	by	mayor	but	does	not	mobilize	against	proposals	enacted	by	regulatory	agencies.	Chicago	 No	action	 Extensive	leveling	(e.g.,	fees	that	are	higher	than	taxis)	 Successful	mobilization	against	fingerprinting.		
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had	begun	to	regulate;	there,	Uber’s	entry	was	met	with	a	ban.	In	Austin	and	Philadelphia,	Uber	nevertheless	continued	to	operate,	aided	by	software	that	produced	a	fake	version	of	the	Uber	app	to	thwart	regulators	and	law	enforcement.16	
	
Step	2:	Regulating	disruption			Cities	must	next	decide	how	they	will	regulate	Uber.	As	discussed	above,	we	expect	hi-tech	progressive	cities	to	face	counter-pressures;	old,	 industrial	cities	to	do	more	to	harmonize	TNC	 regulations	 with	 those	 on	 taxis;	 and	 Texas	 cities	 to	 be	 Uber	 friendly.	 	 We	 focus	 on	regulations	that	have	been	particularly	contentious	for	Uber.		Consistent	with	the	contradictory	predictions	of	hi-tech,	progressive	cities,	the	three	cities	differ.	 	 San	 Francisco	 has	 taken	 a	 laissez-faire,	 tech-friendly	 approach	 with	 virtually	 no	regulation.17		 Seattle	 has	 attempted	 two	 regulations	 that	 are	 central	 to	 Uber’s	 business	model.	 	First,	 it	 imposed	vehicle	caps.	 	However,	 it	quickly	backtracked	 following	a	strong	lobbying	 effort	 by	 Uber.18		 Second,	 alone	 among	 US	 cities,	 it	 enacted	 labor	 regulations,	specifically	 the	 right	 of	 drivers	 to	 bargain	 collectively.	 This	 ordinance	 remains	unimplemented,	 as	 its	 legality	 is	 contested	 in	 court.19		 Austin	 has	 adopted	 relatively	 high	levels	 of	 consumer	 protection	 regulation	 including	 fingerprinting,	 in	 a	 pattern	 that	conforms	to	the	other	Texan	cities.			As	 hypothesized,	 regulatory	 agencies	 play	 a	 strong	 role	 in	 the	 old	 industrial	 cities,	particularly	 New	 York	 and	 Philadelphia.	 	 By	 contrast,	 regulatory	 attempts	 by	 elected	officials	have	been	mostly	unsuccessful.	In	New	York,	Mayor	De	Blasio	was	unable	to	impose	regulations	(e.g.,	vehicle	caps)	that	went	beyond	the	extensive	leveling	rules	passed	by	the	Taxi	and	Limousine	Commission	(TLC).20	Politicians	in	Philadelphia	also	had	a	difficult	time	contesting	the	authority	of	the	Philadelphia	Parking	Authority	(PPA),	a	longstanding	agency	that	 has	 regulated	 taxis.	 The	 PPA	 was	 constrained	 only	 when	 the	 state	 legislature	intervened	 in	2016	 to	end	 the	ban	and	preempt	 further	city-level	 regulation.21	In	Chicago,	ride-hailing	is	regulated	by	the	Department	of	Business	Affairs	and	Consumer	Protection,	an	agency	with	a	broader	mandate	than	New	York’s	TLC	or	Philadelphia’s	PPA.	 	This	Chicago	agency	has	played	a	lesser	role	and	the	elected	city	council	and	mayor,	a	greater	regulatory	role.				Also	 as	 hypothesized,	 regulations	 in	 the	 industrial	 cities	 have	 done	 the	most	 to	 level	 the	playing	 field	 with	 taxis.	 New	 York	 went	 furthest,	 with	 TNCs	 facing	 many	 of	 the	 same	requirements	 as	 taxicabs,	 including	 driver	 training,	 fingerprint-based	 background	 checks,	and	 commercial	 licenses	 for	 drivers.22	Chicago	 adopted	 some	 regulations	 for	 TNCs	 that	exceeded	those	of	 taxicabs,	such	as	higher	city	 taxes	on	pick-ups	and	drop-offs	at	popular	tourist	 destinations. 23 	As	 mentioned,	 TNCs	 were	 banned	 in	 Philadelphia—albeit	ineffectively—until	late	2016.24																																																											
16 Isaac 2017a.  
17 Rayle and Flores 2016. 
18 Soper 2014. 
19 Levy 2017. 
20 Jorgensen and Bredderman 2016. 
21 Laughlin 2017. 
22 Sanchez 2015. 
23 Barnes 2017. 
24 Tanenbaum 2016. 
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Finally,	 the	Texas	 Sunbelt	 cities	were	predicted	 to	be	 the	 least	 likely	 to	 regulate.	 Yet,	 San	Antonio,	Austin,	and	Houston	all	implemented	fingerprint-based	background	checks,	which	Uber	 vehemently	 opposed.25		 Below,	we	discuss	 the	 oppositional	 tactics	 of	Uber,	 but	 note	here	 that	 in	 San	 Antonio,	 Uber’s	 extensive	mobilization	was	 effective,	 and	 the	 regulation	was	 overturned	 (as	 it	 was	 in	 the	 other	 two	 cities	 when	 state	 legislation	 was	 passed	 to	preempt	local	regulations).26				City	 regulation	 of	 Uber	 thus	 varies	 substantially.	 	 These	 cases	 mostly	 support	 our	hypotheses:	 the	 “cross-pressured”	 hi-tech,	 progressive	 cities	 did	 not	 follow	 a	 consistent	pattern.	The	old,	industrial	cities	did	not	extend	the	taxi	regulatory	regime	to	TNCs,	but	they	did	implement	the	most	extensive	leveling	regulations,	with	specialized	regulatory	agencies	leading	the	way.	The	Texas	cities	departed	from	the	hypothesized	pattern	in	passing	one	of	the	most	contentious	regulations—fingerprinting.		Uber	has	accepted	 certain	 consumer	protection	and	 safety	 regulations	 that	 are	 consistent	with	 its	 need	 to	 build	 customer	 trust.	 All	 of	 our	 cities,	with	 the	 notable	 exception	 of	 San	Francisco,	have	implemented	such	basic	regulations.	However,	other	regulations	have	been	more	 contentious,	 and	 Uber	 has	 vigorously	 opposed	 those	 it	 fears	 will	 restrict	 the	 easy	entry	 of	 drivers	 and	 the	 supply	 of	 cars	 on	 the	 road,	 like	 fingerprint-based	 background	checks,	vehicle	caps,	and,	in	the	most	extreme	case,	full	bans.	Each	of	our	cities,	except	San	Francisco,	27	implemented	at	least	one	of	these	contentious	regulations;	however,	in	almost	every	case	these	regulations	have	been	subsequently	overturned	following	Uber	opposition	at	 the	 city	 or	 state	 level.	 Also	 contentious	 are	 labor	 regulations,	 which	 only	 Seattle	 has	addressed	 through	 legislation.	 Like	 labor	 issues,	 public	 goods	 regulations	 have	 also	 been	largely	 ignored.	However,	 it	should	be	noted	that	 labor	and	public	goods	are	beginning	to	receive	some	attention:	 in	 late	2017	and	early	2018	New	York	City	 regulators	announced	that	they	are	pursuing	a	wage	floor	for	drivers	and	a	vehicle	cap	to	decrease	congestion;	San	Francisco’s	mayor	reached	a	deal	with	Uber	and	Lyft	to	create	designated	pick-up	points	to	decrease	 congestion;	 and	 Chicago	 imposed	 an	 additional	 tax	 on	 Uber	 to	 fund	 public	transit.28			
Step	3:	Uber	strategies	to	influence	city-level	regulation		Uber	has	tried	to	influence	or	change	regulatory	outcomes	through	a	combination	of	insider	(i.e.	directly	lobbying	elected	officials)	and	outsider	(i.e.	mobilizing	drivers,	customers,	and	the	 public)	 strategies.	 The	 outsider	 strategies	 are	 particularly	 novel,	 taking	 advantage	 of	technological	features	of	the	platform	economy.			The	 app	 provides	 both	 a	 list	 of	 drivers	 and	 customers	 and	 an	 efficient	 way	 of	communicating	with	them.		It	has	been	a	powerful	tool	in	mobilizing	customers	and	drivers	to	advocate	for	Uber’s	position	on	regulatory	matters	by	merely	clicking	a	link.	For	instance,	in	New	York	and	Austin,	Uber	presented	a	new	“view”	of	its	app,	designed	to	target	officials	who	had	proposed	vehicle	caps	and	fingerprinting,	respectively.29	When	customers	opened	the	app,	a	pop-up	message	appeared,	asserting	that	New	York	City	Mayor	Bill	De	Blasio	and																																																									
25 Wear 2015. 
26 Griswold and Grabar 2015. 
27 The San Francisco city government issued a short-lived cease and desist order for UberCab in 2010 but 
not on UberX. 
28 Barone 2018.  Rodriguez 2017; Flegenheimer 2015. Small 2017. 
29 Tepper 2015; McGlinchy and Weber 2015. 
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Austin	 Councilwoman	 Ann	 Kitchen	 were	 proposing	 regulations	 that	 would	 make	 it	impossible	 for	 Uber	 to	 operate.	 Customers	 were	 then	 provided	 a	 link	 to	 register	 their	opposition	to	the	regulations.			In	addition	 to	 this	 “clicktivism,”	Uber	has	made	extensive	use	of	online	petitions,	which	 it	has	publicized	to	drivers	and	customers.	For	example,	to	oppose	the	Philadelphia	ban,	Uber	organized	 a	 petition,	 which	 garnered	 127,000	 signatures.30	Uber	 also	 used	 the	 contact	information	 from	 petition	 signatories	 to	 automatically	 generate	 emails	 that	 opposed	regulations	 and	 that	were	 sent	 to	 policymakers.31	The	 company	 has	 even	 initiated	 public	referenda,	a	strategy	that	resulted	in	the	suspension	of	vehicle	caps	in	Seattle	but	failed	to	overturn	 fingerprint-based	 background	 checks,	 a	 consumer	 protection	 issue,	 in	 Austin.	These	strategies	have	been	enhanced	by	Uber’s	extensive	use	of	media.	The	company	has	taken	out	ads	in	newspapers	and	on	television	to	target	public	officials,	like	Councilwoman	Kitchen	and	Mayor	De	Blasio,	and	to	publicize	 its	referenda	and	online	petitions.32	Finally,	outside	of	traditional	mobilizing	efforts,	Uber	has	directly—and	deceptively—manipulated	public	opinion	data	available	to	local	regulators.	In	some	cities,	the	company	has	asked	its	employees	 to	 devise	 computer	 programs	 that	 automatically	 respond	 to	 city-administered	surveys	in	a	way	favorable	to	the	company.33			Uber’s	 strategies	 have	 been	 employed	 primarily	 against	 elected	 officials	 and	 have	mostly	been	successful.	While	the	direct	effects	of	these	efforts	cannot	be	meaningfully	measured,	Uber’s	 goals	 were	 ultimately	 accomplished	 in	 defeating	 vehicle	 caps	 in	 Seattle	 and	 New	York	 City,	 in	 legalizing	 UberX	 in	 Philadelphia,	 and	 in	 eliminating	 fingerprint-based	background	checks	in	the	Texas	cities.			Uber	calculates	strategically,	and	in	its	largest	markets,	it	has	ultimately	accepted	even	the	regulations	 it	most	 opposes.	 In	 the	 largest	 ride-hailing	 city,	New	York,	Uber	has	 accepted	fingerprinting	 and	 other	 regulations	 that	 are	 substantially	 equivalent	 to	 those	 on	 taxis—with	 the	 important	 exceptions	 of	 vehicle	 caps	 and	 fare	 control.	 	 In	 Austin,	 Uber	 followed	through	on	 its	 threat	 to	 leave	 in	 response	 to	 fingerprinting,	 but	 in	Houston,	 the	 company	remained	 in	 the	 larger	 market,	 despite	 similar	 threats.34	However,	 in	 both	 cities,	 the	requirement	was	subsequently	overturned	by	Uber-supported	state	legislation.35			In	other	cities,	Uber’s	 threats	 to	 leave	a	market	have	been	an	effective	tool	of	overturning	regulations.	Officials	in	San	Antonio	retracted	a	fingerprinting	ordinance	after	Uber	left	the	city	 in	protest,	and	 in	2016,	Chicago	pulled	a	proposed	 fingerprinting	ordinance	 following	Uber’s	 threat	 to	 leave	 the	city.36	Regulatory	agencies	comprised	of	appointed	officials,	 like	the	TLC	in	New	York	and—for	a	while—the	PPA	in	Philadelphia,	have	been	less	affected	by	pressure	 brought	 by	 Uber	 and	more	 prone	 to	 adopt	 and	maintain	 regulations	 that	 Uber	opposes.		Thus,	 Uber	 succeeded	 everywhere	 in	 disrupting	 city	 ride-hailing	 regulatory	 regimes	 of	entry	and	price	controls.		In	the	subsequent	process	of	regulating	this	disruption,	cities	have																																																									
30 Moore 2016. 
31 Isaac 2017b. 
32 Theis 2015; Hunte 2015; Laughlin 2016. 
33 Isaac 2017b. 
34 Bennett 2016. 
35 Herkovitz 2017. 
36 Madhani 2016.  
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varied	 with	 respect	 to	 consumer	 protection,	 safety,	 and	 other	 competition	 regulations,	which	were	also	initially	violated.		These	have	been	less	contentious	because	Uber	depends	on	consumer	trust,	which	these	regulations	enhance.	The	high	priority	issues	for	Uber	have	been	those	that	challenge	its	business	model	of	high	and	flexible	supply,	particularly	vehicle	caps,	 fingerprint-based	 background	 checks,	 and	 drivers’	 rights	 as	workers.	 As	 a	 powerful	player	with	significant	instrumental	and	structural	power,	Uber	has	prevented	or	defeated	almost	all	of	these	regulations.		
	
	
REGULATION	BY	STATE	GOVERNMENTS		States,	which	have	historically	played	a	limited	role	in	regulating	the	taxi	sector,	have	often	intervened	 to	 regulate	 TNCs.	 	 In	 fact,	 many	 states,	 having	 been	 lobbied	 by	 Uber,	 have	wrested	 control	 from	 cities,	 preempting	 municipal	 regulation.37		 By	 December	 2016,	 38	states	 had	 passed	 TNC	 legislation.	 	 We	 analyze	 an	 original	 database	 of	 all	 state-level	legislation	passed	between	2014	and	2016,	drawn	 from	 the	Open	States	website.	We	 test	several	hypotheses	about	state-level	characteristics	and	regulatory	outcomes.		We	then	turn	to	a	case	study	of	California.			Like	cities,	states	have	generally	acted	in	only	three	categories	of	the	regulatory	agenda—consumer	protection,	safety,	and	other	competition.	States	have	not	diverged	significantly	in	the	emphasis	given	to	each	of	these	categories,	with	a	high	correlation	in	regulations	passed	across	categories	(Table	3).				 Table	3.	Correlation	of	percent	of	regulations	passed	by	category					 	Consumer	protection	
	
	
Other	
competition	
	
	
Safety	
	
	
Consumer	
Protection	
	
1		 0.88	 0.76	
	
Other	
competition	
	
	 1	 0.81	
	
Safety	
	
	 	 1			States	 tend	 to	 cluster	 into	 groups	 of	 “high”	 and	 “low”	 regulators	 (Figure	 2).	 A	 number	 of	“usual	suspects”	might	explain	this	variation.	A	first	pair	of	hypotheses	is	that	ideology	and	partisanship	may	influence	regulatory	outcomes,	with	liberal,	democratic	states	expected	to	regulate	more.	A	third	hypothesis	is	that	more	urban	states	will	regulate	more	because	Uber	serves	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 the	 state’s	 population.	 Measures	 of	 ideology,	 partisanship,																																																									
37 See also Borkholder, Montgomery, Chen, and Smith 2018. 
  14 
urbanization	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 level	 of	 regulation	 (Figures	 A1-A3).	Notably,	regulations	pass	as	bipartisan	processes,	with	most	bills	garnering	over	70	percent	support	from	both	parties	(Figure	3).			
	Figure	2.	Histogram	of	Total	Number	of	Regulations	(states	that	have	regulated)		 	
	Figure	3.	Bipartisan	Support	of	TNC	Regulation			An	examination	of	the	content	of	regulations	indicates	that	even	“high”	regulators	are	quite	moderate	 in	 the	 regulations	 they	 enact.	 Fingerprint-based	 background	 checks	 have	 been	passed	 in	 only	 one	 state,	 Kansas,	which	 subsequently	 repealed	 the	 requirement.	No	 state	has	mandated	vehicle	caps,	imposed	a	ban,	or	reclassified	drivers	as	employees.	Sometimes,	these	 regulations	 simply	 institutionalize	 practices	 Uber	 already	 follows	 (e.g.,	 no	 cash	payment).	 	As	 in	cities,	 states	primarily	 legislate	on	 those	consumer	protection	and	safety	
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requirements	 that	Uber	accepts	because	 they	are	 thought	 to	 increase	consumer	 trust	at	a	minimal	cost.				
CALIFORNIA:		THE	FIRST	STATE	TO	REGULATE	
	To	illustrate	the	politics	of	Uber	regulation,	we	examine	the	particularly	contentious	initial	regulation	of	TNCs	in	California,	the	first	state	to	regulate.	This	instance	of	TNC	regulation	demonstrates	many	of	the	political	dynamics	that	have	characterized	subsequent	regulatory	efforts,	particularly	the	strength	of	concentrated	private	interests,	the	weakness	of	drivers	and	customers	as	autonomous	actors,	and	the	strategies	Uber	uses	to	fight	regulation.				The	 California	 Public	 Utilities	 Commission	 (CPUC)	 took	 the	 first	 step	 in	 2013	 by	 passing	insurance	 requirements	 for	 drivers	 with	 passengers,	 among	 other	 minimal	 consumer	protection	and	safety	regulations.38	Regulation	then	moved	to	the	state	legislature	following	the	highly	publicized	death	of	six-year-old	Sophia	Liu,	who	was	struck	and	killed	by	an	Uber	driver	in	January	2014.39		The	driver	was	logged	into	the	app	but	not	engaged	in	a	ride	and	thus	not	required	by	the	CPUC	to	be	covered	by	Uber’s	commercial	insurance	policy.	Since	the	driver	was	using	his	car	for	commercial	purposes,	his	personal	insurance	policy	would	not	 cover	 the	 accident.	 In	 response	 to	 this	 “gap”	 in	 insurance	 coverage,	 the	 chair	 of	 the	Business	 and	 Consumer	 Protection	 Committee	 in	 the	 California	 State	 Assembly,	 Susan	Bonilla,	proposed	a	law	requiring	commercial	insurance	whenever	drivers	were	logged	onto	the	app.40			Private	interests	were	active	participants	in	the	policy	process.	Taxi	companies	weighed	in,	issuing	written	 statements	and	 lobbying	 legislators	 to	 regulate	TNCs	as	 they	 regulate	 taxi	companies	 on	 issues	 of	 consumer	 protection,	 safety,	 and	 public	 goods.41	However,	 they	were	unable	 to	 achieve	any	 leveling	 regulations	beyond	 insurance	 requirements,	 an	 issue	on	which	 they	were	 aligned	with	 insurance	 companies,	 which	 organized	 a	 coalition	with	consumer	 advocates	 and	 personal	 injury	 lawyers	 in	 support	 of	 Bonilla’s	 bill	 and	participated	 in	 its	 drafting.42	Although	 influential,	 insurance	 companies	 are	 essentially	 a	one-issue	actor.	
	Uber	 was	 extremely	 active	 in	 opposing	 the	 Bonilla	 bill.	 While	 it	 ultimately	 accepted	insurance	regulations,	it	initially	argued	that	personal	insurance	should	cover	drivers	when	they	 have	 the	 app	 on	 but	 are	 not	 engaged	 in	 a	 ride.	 Uber	 opposed	 the	 requirement	 of	commercial	insurance	either	as	a	cost	to	itself	or	one	to	drivers	that	would	pose	a	barrier	to	their	entry.			Uber	employed	the	dual	 insider-outsider	strategy	outlined	above.	 It	used	 its	vast	 financial	resources	to	hire	14	of	the	top	15	lobbying	firms	in	Sacramento,	and	it	hired	former	Obama	campaign	 manager	 David	 Plouffe	 “to	 make	 sure…the	 right	 outcomes	 happen.”43		 Uber	enlisted	 the	 support	 of	 nonprofit	 public	 interest	 groups,	 most	 notably	 Mothers	 Against	Drunk	 Driving	 (MADD),	 to	 which	 Uber	 has	 donated	 a	 percentage	 of	 fares	 on	 major																																																									
38 Ha 2013. 
39 Constine 2014. 
40 Lieber 2014. 
41 Interview, California legislative aide 2015. 
42 Interview, California legislative aide 2015. 
43 Interview, California legislative aide 2015; Badger and Goldfarb 2014. 
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holidays.44	MADD	 sent	 letters	 to	 the	 governor	 and	 legislature	 opposing	 the	 Bonilla	 bill,	arguing	that	TNCs	decrease	drunk	driving	and	that	the	proposed	regulations	would	inhibit	the	operation	of	this	service.45		Uber	also	successfully	sought	lobbying	assistance	from	high-profile	Silicon	Valley	 investors,	 like	Ron	Burkle	and	 John	Doerr,	as	well	as	celebrities,	 like	Ashton	Kutcher,	who	bombarded	Assembly	members	with	phone	calls.46			Uber’s	outsider	strategy	to	shape	and	mobilize	public	opinion	was	also	multi-pronged.	The	company	hired	nearly	 all	 of	 Sacramento’s	public	 relations	 firms	 to	 improve	 its	 image	and	sent	 pro-Uber	 material	 to	 newspapers	 throughout	 California.47	As	 part	 of	 this	 public-oriented	 strategy,	Uber	 also	 targeted	 legislators	who	 supported	or	were	undecided	 about	the	bill.	In	one	of	the	clearest	instances	of	such	a	strategy,	Uber	targeted	the	bill’s	sponsor	and	launched	a	public	campaign	in	the	district	where	she	planned	to	run	for	state	Senate	in	2015,	claiming	that	she	was	anti-technology	and	a	stooge	of	the	insurance	industry.48			As	 in	 cities,	 Uber	 used	 app-enabled	 clicktivism	 to	 mobilize	 consumers	 and	 drivers	 in	 a	campaign	of	pressure	politics.	Just	before	the	vote	on	the	California	bill,	Uber	used	its	app	to	tell	 customers	 that	 the	 proposed	 regulations	 threatened	 its	 operation	 in	 the	 state	 and	initiated	a	petition	through	the	app.49	The	company	then	contacted	local	news	outlets	to	film	boxes	of	petitions	being	delivered	to	Assemblywoman	Bonilla’s	office.50			The	 California	 case	 illustrates	 the	 elite-driven	 policymaking	 pattern	 typical	 of	 Uber	regulation.	 Concentrated	 private	 interests	 were	 influential,	 particularly	 incumbents	 and	challengers,	but	also	in	this	case,	the	insurance	companies.	Although	a	more	comprehensive	bill	was	initially	proposed,	the	final	legislation	included	only	weakened	insurance	coverage	requirements	 that	correspond	to	a	compromise	amenable	 to	both	Uber	and	 the	 insurance	industry.	 Customers	 and	 drivers,	 dispersed	 and	 unorganized,	 did	 not	 have	 autonomous	input	into	the	policy	process.		To	the	extent	they	were	participants,	they	were	mobilized	by	Uber	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 maintaining	 service	 and	 work.	 	 But	 they	 were	 mobilized	 against	regulations	that	may	have	benefited	both	groups:	more	extensive	consumer	protection	for	consumers	and	Uber-provided	commercial	insurance	for	drivers.51		The	 case	 of	 California	 also	 illustrates	 Uber’s	 structural	 power.	 Policymakers	 value	 Uber’s	presence	as	a	source	of	 service	and	work,	and	 fear	disinvestment	or	withdrawal	 from	the	market.	 	 Many	 also	 see	 regulatory	 policy	 as	 signaling	 either	 their	 welcoming	 or	 hostile	attitude	 toward	 innovation	 and	 hi-tech	 companies	more	 generally.	 The	 fear	 of	 appearing	“anti-tech”	 and	 possibly	 losing	 future	 opportunities	 to	 attract	 and	 spur	 post-industrial	economic	activity	may	be	observed	 in	the	CPUC’s	explicit	 initial	regulatory	 language:	“The	purpose	of	this	Rulemaking	is	not	to	stifle	innovation	and	the	provision	of	new	services	that	consumers	want.”52		
	
																																																									
44 Kalanick and Withers 2014.  
45 Griffin 2014. 
46 Hoge 2014. 
47 Kirkham and Lien 2015. 
48 Dillon 2016. 
49 Lien 2015. 
50Young 2014. 
51Helderman 2014.  
52 California Public Utilities Commission 2013. 
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City-State	Comparison	
	In	 general,	 states	have	become	new	 regulators	 of	 for-hire	 transportation	operating	 at	 the	municipal	 level.	 Typically	more	 conservative	 than	 cities,	 states	have	 regulated	Uber	more	lightly	 than	 cities	have.	 	A	 large	number	have	preempted	municipal	 regulation,	 and	many	have	introduced	model	 legislation	advocated	by	Uber.53		Only	a	few	state	 legislatures	have	passed	regulations	that	explicitly	allow	cities	to	regulate	TNCs.			That	said,	while	cities	have	been	somewhat	bolder,	disrupted	regulation	has	been	generally	Uber	 friendly	 in	 both	 cities	 and	 states.	 	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 insurance	 regulation	 in	California	 and	 a	 short-lived	 fingerprinting	 ordinance	 in	 Kansas,	 states,	 more	 than	 cities,	have	avoided	regulations	that	Uber	most	opposes.	We	find	that	cities	have	 implemented	a	number	 of	 these	 regulations,	 although	 most	 have	 been	 overturned	 in	 cities	 or	 states	following	extensive	mobilization	by	Uber.				State	action	conforms	to	Uber’s	preference	for	uniform	regulation	rather	than	a	“patchwork	of	 local	 regulations	 that	 [are]	 in	 conflict	 to	 [sic]	 each	 other.”54	Our	 database	 of	 state-level	regulation	 revealed	 that	 through	 2016,	 twenty	 state	 laws	 had	 explicitly	 preempted	municipalities	from	implementing	regulations	on	TNCs,	both	as	a	way	to	prevent	cities	from	implementing	 regulations	 that	 go	 further	 than	 the	 state	 and	 to	 overturn	 city-level	regulations.55		 For	 example,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 the	 Texas	 legislation	 used	 preemption	 to	override	 fingerprinting	 ordinances	 passed	 by	 Austin	 and	 Houston.	 	 Other	 states,	 like	Pennsylvania,	 while	 not	 precluding	 all	 city-level	 regulations,	 passed	 laws	 to	 invalidate	specific	 city	 laws.	Notably,	while	neither	 states	nor	 cities	have	generally	 considered	 labor	regulation,	 a	 few	 states,	 including	 North	 Carolina,	 Arkansas,	 Michigan,	 Indiana,	 West	Virginia,	 Florida,	 and	 Ohio,	 have	 codified	 the	 status	 of	 TNC	 drivers	 as	 independent	contractors.	 Generally,	 then,	 preemption	 of	 city-level	 regulation	 by	 state	 legislatures	 has	resulted	in	regulatory	outcomes	that	align	with	Uber’s	preferences.				Finally,	the	states	have	often	passed	model	legislation	advocated	by	Uber.		The	first	example	pertained	to	insurance.		After	opposing	one	another	in	the	2014	regulatory	process	in	California,	the	major	insurance	companies	and	the	TNCs	privately	negotiated	a	compromise	bill	as	model	legislation	for	other	states.56	The	insurance	companies	sought	to	prevent	drivers	from	using	their	personal	insurance	policy	while	driving	and	to	take	advantage	of	a	new	market	of	TNC	commercial	drivers.	After	initial	opposition	in	California,	Uber	and	Lyft	saw	a	benefit	in	standard	insurance	requirements	across	states.	The	negotiated	model	legislation	advocated	differential	insurance	requirements	during	the	three	stages	of	the	drivers’	work	(i.e.	before	the	rider	is	assigned,	on	the	way	to	pick	up	a	rider,	and	when	a	rider	is	in	the	vehicle)	with	TNCs	sharing	responsibility	for	coverage	with	drivers.		Of	the	38	states	that	had	regulated	TNCs	by	2016,	over	75	percent	have	implemented	the	exact	model	(Figure	4).		More	generally,	model	legislation	addressing	other	issues	has	been	proposed	
																																																								
53 The National Center for Cities puts this number at 41. 
54 Hanks 2017. 
55 In 2017, an additional six states passed laws explicitly preempting city-level regulation.  The issue of 
municipal preemption of TNC laws remains legally ambiguous in a number of states.  In 2017 the National 
League of Cities reported that a total of 37 cities have preempted the authority of cities, and a 2018 National 
Employment Law Program report suggested that 41 states have interfered to some degree with local policy 
making (DuPuis, et. al. 2017; Borkholder, et. al. 2018).  
56 O’Donnell 2015. 
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and	circulated	by	TNC	lobbyists	and	the	American	Legislative	Exchange	Council	(ALEC).57		In	several	states,	including	Ohio,	Texas,	and	Florida,	public	records	unearthed	by	the	National	Employment	Law	Program	indicate	that	Uber	wrote	or	co-wrote	the	state	legislation.58					 						 	 	 		 Figure	4.	Histogram	of	State	Insurance	Regulation	Relative	to	the	Model			
Uber	Strategies	
	We	have	 seen	 that	Uber	has	been	 successful	 in	 entering	markets	 and	disrupting	 the	 ride-hailing	regulatory	regime	and	has	also	been	influential	in	shaping	the	subsequent	regulation	of	 platform-based	 ride-hailing.	 	 It	 has	 done	 this	 by	 deploying	 a	 vast	 array	 of	 strategies,	which	are	enabled	by	Uber’s	significant	material	resources,	unique	mobilizational	capacity	through	the	app,	and	structural	power	as	a	source	of	jobs	and	hi-tech	reputation.			Table	 4	 summarizes	 these	 strategies.	 Some	 strategies	 are	 associated	 with	 Uber’s	instrumental	 power	 while	 others	 are	 associated	 with	 its	 structural	 power.	 Instrumental	power	can	be	used	to	 influence	 legislators	directly	 through	 insider	strategies	or	 indirectly	through	 outsider	 strategies.	 Insider	 strategies	 have	 been	 most	 prominent	 in	 models	 of	regulatory	 capture,	 and	 indeed	 they	 are	 key	 in	 Uber’s	 arsenal.	 Uber	 deploys	 significant	financial	resources	to	undertake	intense	lobbying,	particularly	at	the	state	level.			In	both	cities	and	states,	Uber	employs	a	number	of	outsider	strategies,	through	which	the	company	 influences	 policymakers	 through	 popular	 mobilization.	 Uber	 has	 mobilized	 its	drivers	 and	 customers	 to	 oppose	 regulations.	While	 analysts	 like	Walker	 have	 examined	such	 mobilizational	 efforts	 by	 firms,	 the	 technology	 of	 the	 app	 allows	 Uber	 to	 go	 even	further.59		The	Uber	app	is	itself	a	novel	resource	for	mobilization	of	drivers	and	customers.	Further,	Uber	has	mobilized	the	broader	public	through	media	campaigns	and	referenda.																																																													
57 Borkholder, et. al. 2018, 11. 
58 Borkholder, et. al. 2018, 20. 
59 Walker 2014. 
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Table	4.	Uber	Strategies		Structural	Power	 • Threats	to	leave	markets	
• Hi-tech	reputation	Instrumental	Power:	Insider		Strategies	
• Hiring	of	lobbying	firms	and	celebrities	
• Alliance	 formation	 with	 non-profit	 groups	(e.g.,	MADD)	
• Alliance	 formation	 with	 other	 interested	actors	(e.g.,	insurance)	
Instrumental	Power:	Outsider		Strategies	
• Clicktivism		
• Online	petitions	
• Public	relations	strategies	
• Referenda		
• Targeting	sponsors	of	regulation	
• Manipulation	of	public	opinion	data			Uber’s	 structural	 power	 is	 also	 notable	 and	 derives	 from	 its	 threats	 to	 disinvest	 and	 its	perceived	economic	benefits.		Uber	provides	“flexible”	work	that	accommodates	many	in	the	21st	 century	 job	market.	 	Government	decision-makers	also	 see	 regulation	 in	 terms	of	 the	city’s	or	state’s	reputation	as	tech	friendly,	affecting	future	growth.		The	divestment	threat	is	a	 real	 one,	 as	 Uber	 has	 indeed	 left	 markets	 in	 response	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 specific	regulations.	 	Furthermore,	Uber	actively	wields	this	threat,	as	 it	explicitly	threatens	that	 it	will	leave	a	market.					
JUDICIAL	VENUES	
	As	 noted,	 regulation	 in	 cities	 and	 states,	 played	 out	 among	 regulators,	 incumbents,	 and	challengers,	 has	 been	 virtually	 silent	 on	 labor	 regulation.	 Yet,	 the	 labor-capital	 cleavage	within	 the	challenger	 interest	 is	a	prominent	one	 in	 the	politics	of	TNC	regulation.	Online	driver	 forums	 indicate	 the	 many	 grievances	 that	 drivers	 have	 against	 Uber.	 	 Drivers	complain	of	fare	cuts,	lack	of	transparency	in	pay	calculation,	high	expenses	associated	with	driving,	 fear	of	 termination	associated	with	Uber’s	 rating	system,	and	 lack	of	 training	and	driver	support—many	of	which	could	be	addressed	through	existing	labor	and	employment	laws.60	The	 neglect	 in	 cities	 and	 states	 of	 worker	 protection	 issues	 reflects	 imbalance	 of	political	influence	and	the	collective	action	problems	of	dispersed	drivers.			Legal	analysts	have	suggested	that	politically	weak	groups	“are	almost	always	compelled	to	resort	to	litigation,”	and	that	litigation	is	“a	technique	to	be	employed	when	goals	are	clearly	unattainable	 in	 other	 political	 forums.”61		 The	 Uber	 case	 comports	 with	 this	 theory	 of	political	disadvantage.	As	atomized,	dispersed	actors,	drivers	are	unable	 to	bring	effective	claims	 in	 legislative	 venues.	 Even	 in	 courts,	 worker	 protection	 issues	 are	 rarely	 brought	through	 the	 initiative	of	groups	of	drivers.	 Instead,	most	cases	are	brought	by	surrogates,	both	 plaintiffs’	 attorneys	 who	 bring	 lawsuits	 against	 Uber	 on	 behalf	 of	 drivers	 and																																																									
60 These complaints were evident in our survey and interviews with workers and many analyses, including a 
popular blog “Harry the Rideshare Guy.”  See, e.g., Campbell 2016. 
61 Epstein 1985, 10. 
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government	agencies	that	investigate	the	company	for	violation	of	laws	that	would	protect	drivers.			As	a	venue	of	regulation,	 judicial	processes	have	a	distinct	 logic.	Unlike	 legislative	venues,	where	 lawmakers	 can	 break	 new	 ground	 by	 passing	 laws,	 courts	 and	 administrative	agencies	 judge	 compliance	 with	 existing	 statutes,	 regulations,	 and	 previous	 judicial	decisions.	 	 Uber’s	 own	 approach	 to	 the	 law	 “as	 something	 to	 be	 tested”	 has,	 perhaps	unsurprisingly,	resulted	in	much	litigation.62				We	focus	here	on	lawsuits	regarding	worker	protections	and	misclassification.	These	have	been	a	strikingly	 frequent	 form	of	 litigation	against	Uber,	constituting	approximately	one-third	of	all	lawsuits	against	the	company,	as	opposed	to	two	to	five	percent	of	cases	against	large	multi-national	 tech	companies.63		These	cases	reflect	an	 intra-producer	cleavage,	 the	classic	 struggle	 between	 labor	 and	 capital,	which	 is	 an	 important	 component	 of	 the	Uber	model	of	disrupted	regulation.			We	analyze	a	database	of	dockets	across	 federal	and	 three	 state	 courts	 (California,	Texas,	and	New	 York)	 from	 2012-2016.64		 These	 three	 states	were	 chosen	 because	 they	 include	multiple	cities	with	large	Uber	markets;	because	key	test	cases	were	filed	in	both	California	and	New	York;	and	because	 they	each	represent	different	political	and	 legal	 regimes	with	regard	to	worker	protections.		California	is	a	progressive	state	with	an	expansive,	employee-friendly	labor	code;	New	York	is	also	a	progressive	state	but	our	review	of	state	labor	codes	indicates	that	it	has	fewer	state	worker	protections;	and	Texas	is	a	conservative	state	with	limited	 state	 labor	 protections.	 Unsurprisingly,	 California	 houses	 the	 largest	 number	 of	lawsuits	against	Uber	alleging	worker	protection	violations.			Reflecting	the	fact	that	drivers	are	an	unorganized	and	atomized	workforce,	most	cases	are	not	brought	by	groups	of	drivers	but	by	surrogates,	who	typically	conceive	of	the	litigation	and	then	recruit	worker	plaintiffs	(not	vice	versa).65	Prominent	among	these	surrogates	are	plaintiffs’	 attorneys,	 who	 have	 brought	 class	 actions.	 	 Like	 all	 surrogates,	 class-action	attorneys	act	simultaneously	“on	behalf	of”	drivers	but	also	in	their	own	interests,	resulting	in	 a	 biasing	 that	 has	 affected	 what	 issues	 have	 been	 litigated	 and	 how	 the	 litigation	proceeds. 66 	Because	 private	 plaintiffs’	 attorneys	 work	 on	 contingency,	 they	 have	 an	incentive	to	bring	cases	that	may	yield	significant	damages	or	large	settlement	sums.67	We	find	that	as	a	result,	 income-related	claims	are	most	commonly	 litigated	against	Uber,	and	most	cases	have	been	settled	or	dismissed	without	resolving	drivers’	employment	status.68	These	settlements	are	enabled	by	Uber’s	significant	material	resources,	and	they	undermine	any	 efforts	 to	 regulate	 Uber	 through	 courts.	 Other	 surrogate	 actors	 representing	 drivers’	interests	in	courts	include	government	bodies	and	an	NGO.																																																												
62 Newcomer 2016. 
63 Bloomberg Litigation Analytics (BLA) search of all litigation against Uber between 2012 and November 
2016.  A BLA search indicates that between November 2012 and November 2017, employment-related 
cases constituted 1.4% of cases against Apple and 4.1% of cases against Amazon.     
64 Bloomberg law search of federal/state cases in which Uber and/or Rasier LLC  (an Uber subsidiary often 
named in court documents) is listed as a defendant.   
65 Interviews with 4 plaintiff attorneys representing Uber drivers in California and 6 plaintiff Uber drivers. 
66 Macey and Miller 1991, 10. 
67 Macey and Miller 1991, 17. 
68 The exceptions include cases that are still pending and cases that are brought by individual drivers in 
administrative contexts.   
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We	focus	below	on	 the	most	 important	 “test”	 cases	 that	were	brought	primarily	 in	courts	but	also	in	administrative	and	regulatory	agencies.69The	majority	of	these	test	cases	involve	the	misclassification	of	Uber	drivers	as	independent	contractors,	a	status	that	denies	them	the	 labor	 and	 employment	 rights	 available	 only	 to	 employees.70	These	 cases	 attempt	 to	apply	existing	employee	laws	to	the	new	case	of	Uber.71		We	group	these	cases	by	the	types	of	rights	litigated.			
Income-related	Claims		The	 vast	 majority	 of	 worker	 protection	 cases	 involve	 income-related	 claims.	 The	 most	important,	 O’Connor	 v.	 Uber,	 is	 a	 misclassification	 case	 filed	 in	 2013	 by	 Shannon	 Liss-Riordan	in	the	Federal	District	of	Northern	California.	Alleging	misclassification	of	drivers,	the	 case	 certified	 a	 large	 class	 of	 drivers	 and,	 if	 successful,	would	have	 challenged	Uber’s	independent-contractor	business	model.72	Many	understood	O’Connor	as	a	test	case	for	the	gig	 economy	more	 generally.73	However,	 rather	 than	 take	 the	 case	 to	 trial,	 in	 2016	 Liss-Riordan	attempted	to	settle	on	unfavorable	terms.74	Indeed,	the	court	subsequently	rejected	the	 settlement	 as	 “unfair”	 to	 drivers.75	The	 case	was	 then	 stymied	 by	 a	 9th	 Circuit	 ruling,	which	decertified	a	portion	of	the	class,	greatly	diminishing	its	size	and	the	potential	impact	of	this	case.76	O’Connor	has	yet	to	be	resolved.			
NYTWA	v.	Uber	was	 filed	 in	 federal	 court	 in	New	York	 in	 June	2016.77	The	New	York	Taxi	Workers	Alliance	(NYTWA)	is	a	20-year-old	NGO	advocating	for	taxi	drivers’	interests.	The	NYTWA’s	membership	now	includes	a	majority	of	Uber	drivers.78		However,	 in	many	of	its	actions,	it	continues	to	see	Uber	as	a	central	threat.	After	having	lost	the	regulatory	battle	to	extend	vehicle	caps	and	fare	controls	to	Uber	when	it	 first	entered	New	York,	 the	NYTWA	turned	to	the	judicial	process.	On	behalf	of	a	class	of	Uber	drivers,	it	alleged	minimum	wage	and	overtime	violations	(as	well	as	unlawful	equipment	and	tools	deductions,	and	unlawful	tax	 and	 surcharge	 deductions).	 Like,	O’Connor,	 these	 claims	 challenge	 the	 status	 of	 Uber	drivers	as	 independent	contractors.	The	NYTWA	maintains	that	 in	 the	absence	of	city	and																																																									
69 Our database captured cases filed in state and federal court.  However, a number of important legal 
decisions and investigations were made at administrative levels or by regulatory agencies.  These were not 
represented by our database because they are only reported if the agency or the parties involved release 
information to the press.  Such investigations and decisions were captured in online searches.  
70 Very few exceptions to this rule exist; for example, in some states, independent contractor construction 
workers do have access to workers’ compensation.     
71 Because private arbitration clauses have been enforced against workers in a large number of states—
including California in 2016—this potential remedy has since slowed. See Tiku 2017.   
72 Boston-based Liss-Riordan filed in California because the state’s judicial interpretation of “employee” 
under the California Labor Code is one of the most expansive nationwide.  She has filed a litany of 
misclassification lawsuits in California against gig economy companies with similar business models to Uber 
including Lyft, Instacart, Amazon, DoorDash, Handy, Caviar, and Grubhub.  To date, only one of these 
cases has been adjudicated at trial.  In February 2018, a federal district court judge found a GrubHub driver 
to be an independent contractor.  See Lawson v. Grubhub, Case No.15-cv-05128-JSC (N.D. Cal 2018).   
73 Interviews, Doug Bloch (Teamsters) 2016; Aaron Peskin (Supervisor, San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors) 2017; Anonymous NLRB attorney 2016, 2017; Anonymous U.S. Department of Labor Wage 
and Hour Attorney 2016; Bhairavi Desai (NYTWA) 2015, 2016. 
74 For a list of some objections made by plaintiffs, See O’Connor v. Uber Technologies Inc., 836 F.3d 1102 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
75 Wong 2016. 
76 The 9th circuit overruled the district court’s decision finding Uber’s arbitration agreement unenforceable. 
See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc.  836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). 
77 Wiessner 2016. 
78 As of January 2018, the NYTWA represented roughly 19,000 drivers, more than half of which are Uber 
drivers. 
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state	regulations	that	limit	the	number	of	TNC	vehicles	and	control	fares,	employee	status	is	the	only	way	 to	 lift	 and	stabilize	 the	earnings	of	TNC	and	 taxi	drivers.79		The	NYTWA	had	never	 previously	 sought	 to	 establish	 employee	 rights	 for	 taxi	 drivers,	 who	 are	 also	independent	 workers,	 but	 rather	 worked	 through	 city	 and	 state	 regulatory	 bodies	 to	advance	 drivers’	 interests,	 avoiding	 the	 issue	 of	worker	 status.80	By	making	 themselves	 a	plaintiff	in	this	case	alongside	their	Uber	driver	members,	the	NYTWA	sought	a	settlement	or	 trial	 adjudication	 that	 would	 undercut	 Uber’s	 business	 model.	 	 However,	 the	 district	court	dismissed	the	NYTWA	as	co-plaintiffs,	claiming	the	organization	lacked	standing.	The	case	remains	undecided.			
Meyer	 v.	 Kalanick,	 a	 federal	 anti-trust	 action	 against	 Uber’s	 co-founder	 Travis	 Kalanick,	alleged	that	Uber’s	mobile	app	amounts	to	a	price-fixing	conspiracy	because	it	coordinates	a	uniform	 price	 among	 Uber	 drivers.	 	 The	 impact	 of	 this	 lawsuit,	 which	 ultimately	 put	 to	question	the	classification	of	Uber	drivers	as	independent	contractors,	was	also	stymied	by	an	appellate	court	ruling	that	sent	the	case	to	private	arbitration.81			 	Finally,	 in	 three	 contexts	not	 involving	a	 legal	 challenge	 to	drivers’	 status	 as	 independent	contractors,	Uber	voluntarily	agreed	to	pay	drivers	for	overcharges	or	underpayment.		One	was	 the	 result	 of	 a	 legal	 investigation	 into	 their	 leasing	 program	 by	 the	 Massachusetts	Attorney	General.82	Another	was	prompted	by	revelations	of	improper	earnings	deductions	made	 public	 by	 the	 NYTWA.83		 Yet	 another,	 in	 which	 Uber	 agreed	 to	 pay	 $20	 million	 to	drivers	 misled	 by	 Uber’s	 exaggerated	 claims	 about	 earnings	 and	 vehicle	 financing,	 was	resolved	 after	 an	 investigation	 by	 the	 Federal	 Trade	 Commission.84		 While	 drivers	 won	monetary	 gains	 in	 all	 three,	 none	 shifted	 the	 legal	 regulatory	 landscape	 with	 regard	 to	workers’	rights.		
	
Job	Security	and	Collective	Action	Claims		Two	legal	claims	against	Uber	involve	the	rights	of	drivers	to	engage	in	collective	action.	In	February	 2016,	 the	 National	 Labor	 Relations	 Board	 Region	 20	 began	 a	 national	investigation	of	Uber’s	labor	practices	to	assess	whether	Uber	has	misclassified	its	workers	as	 independent	 contractors	 under	 the	 National	 Labor	 Relations	 Act.85	This	 investigation	remains	 unresolved.	 Also,	 the	 NYTWA	 filed	 a	 claim	 with	 the	 NLRB	 alleging	 that	 Uber’s	arbitration	provision	for	workers	is	an	unfair	labor	practice	because	it	prevents	class	action	lawsuits.86		The	Supreme	Court	took	up	this	legal	question	in	late	2017.		
Other	Claims			Across	 the	 three	 states	 in	 this	 analysis,	 two	 cases	 against	Uber	 allege	discrimination.	One	was	 dismissed.	 The	 other	 was	 filed	 as	 an	 individual	 Equal	 Employment	 Opportunity	Commission	 (EEOC)	 complaint,	 alleging	 that	 Uber’s	 ratings	 system—which	 can	 result	 in	
																																																								
79 Interview, Bhairavi Desai, 2016. 
80 See Dubal 2017.   
81 Meyer v. Uber Technologies, No. 16-2750 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
82 Massachusetts Attorney General 2017. 
83 Scheiber 2017. 
84 Federal Trade Commission 2017. 
85 Rosenblatt 2016. 
86 Herzfeld 2016. 
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termination—has	 a	 racially	 discriminatory	 impact	 on	 minorities	 because	 of	 passengers’	biases.87	The	resulting	EEOC	investigation	has	not	been	concluded	or	made	public.		Individual	 Uber	 drivers	 in	 states	 across	 the	 country	 have	 filed	 individual	 claims	 in	administrative	 bodies	 alleging	 their	 own	misclassification	 for	 purposes	 of	 unemployment	insurance,	workers’	compensation,	and	unpaid	wages.		Individual	claim-making	is	at	most	a	grievance	 procedure	without	 larger	 impact.88	Under	 res	 judicata,	 administrative	 decisions	from	these	claims	do	not	 form	precedent	and	have	no	consequences	 for	other	drivers.	To	leverage	these	individual	claims	for	broader	regulatory	purposes,	in	2016	the	NYTWA	sued	the	New	York	State	Labor	Department	on	behalf	of	 three	drivers	who	had	 filed	 individual	unemployment	 insurance	 claims	but	did	not	 receive	 a	 timely	 response.	 	As	 a	 remedy,	 the	NYTWA	 asked	 the	 Labor	 Department	 to	 audit	 Uber	 to	 determine	 whether	 drivers	 are	employees	under	New	York	state	laws.		The	case	was	dismissed.89		Thus,	 important	test	cases	have	been	brought	on	workers’	rights	 issues	 in	 judicial	venues,	often	 by	 surrogate	 actors,	 including	 plaintiffs’	 attorneys	 and	 an	 NGO,	 who	 bias	representation	with	their	own	interests,	and	government	agencies,	whose	pro-	or	anti-labor	perspective	varies.	Despite	the	high	level	of	control	Uber	exercises	over	work	conditions,	to	date,	 these	 judicial	 processes	 have	 not	 resulted	 in	 regulatory	 constraint	 on	 Uber’s	 labor	practices.		They	have	been	settled	without	resolution,	stymied	by	arbitration	provisions,	or	remain	mired	in	long	processes.				
Conclusion:	Elite	Politics	of	Disrupted	Regulation	and	Challenger	Capture		Uber’s	 brash	 “act	 first,	 apologize	 later”	 entrance	 into	 urban	 markets	 disrupted	 a	 highly	regulated	ride-hailing	sector	 that	displayed	the	classic	rent-seeking	traits	described	 in	 the	Stigler	 model	 of	 regulatory	 capture.	 	 Prior	 to	 Uber,	 private	 taxi	 interests	 enjoyed	 anti-competitive	barriers	to	entry	and	price	controls.		The	taxi	regulatory	regime,	however,	also	included	public	 interest	 provisions	 in	 the	 form	of	 customer	 and	 labor	 protections,	 safety,	and,	occasionally,	public	 goods.	 Its	disruption	 following	Uber’s	 entry	 raised	key	questions	for	regulators	about	if	and	how	to	regulate	Uber.			Uber	 has	 played	 an	 active	 role	 in	 achieving	 regulatory	 outcomes	 compatible	 with	 its	business	model.	Uber	has	enjoyed	both	structural	and	instrumental	power	and	has	had	the	resources	to	deploy	a	stunning	array	of	insider	and	outsider	strategies.	Its	political	strength	has	 made	 it	 especially	 influential	 in	 the	 legislative	 arena.	 In	 city	 councils	 and	 state	legislatures,	 it	 has	 succeeded	 in	 limiting	 consumer	 and	 safety	 regulations	 to	 those	 that	conform	to	 its	business	model	of	growth,	supply	and	price	 flexibility,	and	 low-cost	service	provision.	In	general,	Uber	has	been	able	to	influence	regulations	and,	in	those	cases	where	it	initially	fails,	often	to	get	them	reversed.	Worker	protections,	vigorously	opposed	by	Uber,																																																									
87 Because this filing was made with the EEOC and is not a lawsuit filed in federal court, it is not publically 
available. As with other administrative contexts, if similar complaints have been filed with the EEOC, we 
would not know unless the plaintiff or his attorney went public with the complaint, as was the case here.   
88 We speculate that the numbers are relatively low; few drivers are likely aware of potential “employee” 
rights or the process to obtain them. We also presume that even fewer are likely to mobilize those rights 
because they are repeatedly told by Uber representatives that they are independent contractors. The 
National Employment Law Project has speculated the number to be “dozens” nationally (Ruckelshaus 2016).   
89 The three drivers were individually determined to be employees for purposes of unemployment insurance.  
Uber is appealing these three decisions claiming the drivers were “handpicked by the NYTWA” (Griswold 
2017).  
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have	rarely	made	 it	 to	 the	agenda	 in	 legislative	arenas.	 	Drivers’	 issues	have	 instead	been	taken	up	as	legal	issues	in	judicial	venues	and	have	not	resulted	in	broad	regulatory	change.		The	Uber	model	of	disrupted	regulation	is	an	elite-driven	politics	of	challenger	capture.	The	major	regulatory	models	in	the	literature	are	not	good	fits	for	this	model.	Most	feature	only	two	 interests—private	 vs.	 public,	 or	 equivalently,	 producer	 vs.	 consumer.	 Interest	alignment	 is	more	complex	 in	the	Uber	case.	The	private	 interest	 is	often	divided,	and	the	private	and	public	 interest	 is	not	always	opposed.	 Intra-producer	conflict	occurs	along	an	incumbent-challenger	 cleavage,	 which	 is	 primarily	 played	 out	 in	 the	 legislative	 arena,	 as	well	 as	 along	 a	 labor-capital	 cleavage,	 which	 is	most	 often	 played	 out	 in	 judicial	 venues.		Atomized	customers	and	drivers	do	not	have	autonomous	power.	They	have	benefited	from	their	 alignment	 with	 private	 interests	 and	 have	 participated	 in	 the	 politics	 of	 regulation	primarily	 when	mobilized	 by	 elite	 actors.	 	 Consumers	 and	 drivers	 are	 aligned	 with,	 and	mobilized	 by,	 Uber	 in	 the	 initial	 disruption	 or	 “deregulatory”	 step	 on	 issues	 of	 entry	 and	price	 controls,	 which	 ensure	 Uber’s	 continued	 presence	 in	 the	market	 as	 a	 provider	 of	 a	service	and	jobs.		In	the	subsequent	TNC	regulatory	step,	consumers	are	aligned	with	taxis	on	 some	 leveling	 issues,	 which	 has	 contributed	 to	 regulations	 addressing	 consumer	protection	 and	 safety.	 	 Drivers	 lack	 alignment	 with	 concentrated	 interests	 in	 legislative	arenas.	As	a	result	of	this	political	disadvantage,	labor	issues	are	taken	up	in	judicial	venues	primarily	by	surrogates,	but	to	date,	without	success.		Disrupted	regulation	has	given	rise	to	a	dual	regulatory	regime	of	the	ride-hailing	sector	in	cities	 across	 the	 country.	 Uber’s	 entry	 undermined	 the	 taxi	 regulatory	 regime	 not	 by	 the	adoption	 of	 deregulatory	 policy	 or	 non-implementation	 through	 “corrosion,”	 but	 by	disruption.	 The	 subsequent	 regulation	 bifurcated	 the	 ride-hailing	 sector	 by	 creating	 an	alternative	 classification	 of	 “TNC,”	 thus	 exempting	 Uber	 from	 taxi	 regulations.	The	regulatory	 regime	 on	 taxi	 incumbents	 remains	 intact	 but	 no	 longer	 operates	 to	 their	advantage.	 	On	 the	 contrary	 it	 puts	 taxis	 at	 a	 competitive	 disadvantage	 relative	 to	 the	regulations	(or	lack	thereof)	for	TNCs.		The	politics	of	regulating	the	new	entrants	has	thus	been	one	of	challenger	capture.	
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